history and complex evolved nodes for management hidden in the arcane language of the trade. It would be necessary --as a way of approaching these areas --not only to find formal legislative and regulatory efforts, but also to be something of an ethnographer of satellite policy, looking at the informal and even forceful ways by which governments assured that their objectives were being met.
In that essay (Price, 1999) , I suggested that, as with trade routes, states concerned with satellites might seek to establish and control sites or ports which would be key aspects of delivery. In some imagined way, satellites were like vessels and one needed to know who owned and operated them, just as, for centuries, it was important to know what ships were under whose control. Not only that, but the vessel's flag and its port of disembarkation could be vital to the question of who had power over the route.
The metaphor was far from perfect, but I thought, and continue to think, that it sheds light on several aspects for governance or regulation: the allocation of slots for geostationary satellites (the orbital slots issue); regulation of launch of satellites; regulation of transponders on satellites; regulation of reception of satellites; regulation of marketing; regulation of retransmission; and finally, regulation relating to content. I have not been so deeply engaged in these questions since I first published the essay as I might have liked, but I have been, from the periphery, trying to see what elements of the metaphor hold up. What remains clear is that to use the word 'governance' to describe the relationship of states to the content of satellite signals is a dramatic form of hyperbole just as it would have been true to define governance in the 18th century for trade in goods.
There is hardly any system. What exists is a hodgepodge of practices, efforts, often desperate, by states or regional and international entities to intervene when a crisis occurs or is perceived to occur. I think this was true of trade routes in the 18th century.
Given the scope of the subject (and the limited extent of my knowledge), I
will have to be selective. I am not going to discuss the ITU and governance in terms of the allocation or assignment of orbital slots. The debate there concerning equitable distribution of orbital positions and first come, first served, has been, now, often told. I am going to pursue another line of questioning arising out of the Trade Routes article: namely whether, rather than look for a universal or global governance scheme, we can find different regional themes, different forms of state intervention that turn on particular satellites, or particular footprints, or particular content. Put in metaphorical terms, does the law governing this trade depend on the ship, the port of call, or the freight (or some combination thereof)?
In this area --the question of regulation of freight, one might say --governance issues have gone through four stages: an extensive debate in the UN and elsewhere to design a system of international standards or process --a debate that ended in shatters; a second stage in which satellites were owned and controlled by governments or government controlled entities so that issues of regulation hardly arose; a period of privatization and competition, where residual national efforts to restrict the impact of signals was accompanied by the surprisingly rapid implementation of an international system of satellites, satellite channels and modes of receiving and distributing them; and finally, now, after the industry has grown, a renewed search for principles for regulation and governance.
In this search, one can identify a few salient efforts: the struggle --still a work in progress --toward transparency and a rule of law within the European Union to determine who has jurisdiction (and applying what standards) over satellite signals received in Europe; a variety of ad hoc methods of bilateral and multilateral informal persuasion and threats; the stretching of existing methods and the adaptation of new ones to affect decisions (see, for example, Canada's novel mode of determining whether Al Jazeera could be carried on cable services and the application of the US Terrorism Exclusion list in the case of Al Manar 2 );
and domestic informal and formal pressures (the difficulty of Al Jazeera
International in gaining shelf space on US cable systems). Governance can take the form, as it does, in the accord between national interest and privatization, of ownership and control of the satellite (as in the administration of Nilesat or Arabsat). One of the most significant aspects in recent developments is the following: efforts to exercise power over the satellite carrier to determine which channels or signals are provided a transponder.
Prior consent debate
When the extraordinary science-fiction laden prospect of satellite communication became widely seen as actually possible, the UN took up the question of whether international regulation would be desirable. After all, the sending of a signal from one country into the territory of another could be looked at as a triumph of free expression or as a potential violation of national sovereignty. Indeed, most terrestrial broadcasting regulation had been established (at least multilaterally) on the idea that in medium and long wave there should be some sort of agreement for the management of broadcasting signals so that national borders
were respected and what might be called 'intended spillover' was minimized.
Both in the UN and UNESCO a similar idea --one of prior consent before a satellite signal was sent transnationally --was debated from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. (2003: 268) . China has demonstrated some flexibility in the application of this principle, either through turning a blind eye to significant use of satellite dishes in certain areas, allowing cable carriage of specified foreign satellite -delivered channels, or permitting carriage of specific channels only in hotels, that could be seen as a carrying out of prior consent, not an abandonment of it.
Period of 'informal' governance and influence
China provides a turn from international law as a governing instrument to a more I have argued, in a book called Media and Sovereignty (Price 2004) , that states employ law, technology, negotiation, subsidy and force to maintain control over the territory of information within their borders. One of the main points of this book is that --far from the principles enunciated in the UN General Assembly
Resolution --states often have specific interests in the information and mediascape of particular target societies and satellite signals may be used to affect those societies. These interventions can be unilateral or negotiated (then more in spirit with the UN principles). I will give some examples. The effort to launch Al Jazeera English in the United States is a study in informal decision-making and informal government influence that lurks somewhere beneath the radar. The channel's attempts to find a place on a major direct-to-home satellite platform or cable system have been largely unsuccessful.
In summer 2006, prior to Al Jazeera English's November launch, it appeared there was a provisional agreement to carry the channel on the Dish satellite network, though its prominence and availability to a mass of subscribers could still be matter of dispute. At the time, Lindsay Oliver, the Dish Network's commercial director, told Broadcasting & Cable that Dish had only offered the network carriage on an Arabic tier, while Al Jazeera wants wider distribution.
Currently, the Dish network carries only the Arabic-language Al Jazeera; the only way to receive Al Jazeera English in the US is via GlobeCast satellite, on a handful of small, regional cable providers, or on the internet. The consistent position, of course, has always been that where a broadcast originates within the EU (not the case with Al Manar), it is the responsibility of the Member State, the so-called 'country of origin,' to regulate it. To this end, a series of practical criteria ('establishment' criteria in TVWF Article 2), are designed to determine by an exhaustive procedure which Member State has jurisdiction.
These criteria are:
• the location of the head office of the provider of services • the place where decisions on programming policy are usually taken • the place where the programme to be broadcast to the public is finally mixed and processed, and • the place where a significant proportion of the workforce required for the pursuit of the television broadcasting activity is located.
If, as was the case with Al Manar, the satellite channel originates in a third country, outside the EU, different rules apply, adjusting to the French precedent.
Member States must ensure that these broadcasters comply with the EU rules if:
• they use a frequency granted by that Member State • they use a satellite capacity appertaining to that Member State, or • they use a satellite up-link situated in that Member State.
Because most TV channels from outside the EU that broadcast in Europe use 
Conclusions
There is no system of global governance with respect to satellite signals and it is doubtful that such a system will emerge. The EU seeks a transparent system with respect to certain kinds of content. In the absence of regulation, informal efforts to persuade, pressure and even threaten satellite providers are likely to take place. We are beginning to sense patterns emerging but it is only as the technology itself is becoming slightly overshadowed. Terrorism is the trope that succeeded where cultural exception, fear of pornography, sweeping cultural imperialism and national identity failed. It has brought the deacons of free expression to the table of regulation, even of clumsy intervention. As a result, the shape of governance of satellite broadcasting, and as a consequence, of the internet, may change forever. For details of debates on the prior consent requirement in particular and regulation of direct broadcasting by satellite in general, see Queeney (1978) ; Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979); and Montgomery and Powell (1985) . In the war against our country, the criminal NATO forces are bothered the most by their inability to conceal from the world public the consequences of their own criminal actions and the killing of innocent people in Yugoslavia. An endless number of times so far, they had intended to silence the Serbian media and prevent them from keeping the domestic and world public informed about the daily crimes committed by the NATO forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: the destruction of the RTS buildings in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Pristina, the brutal killing of journalists, the repeated destruction of radio-TV transmitters, the jamming of RTS signals. However, regardless of all the gross attempts at silencing information and the wish to have only the NATO news circle the globe, they have not succeeded in preventing the massive support lent by the peace-and truth-loving part of mankind to the Serbian people.
Despite the fact that RTS is an Eutelsat shareholder and has met all its financial obligations, the principle of ownership has been abrogated and the possibility denied to present to the world public opinion all the horrors and sufferings of the civilian population, caused by two months of bombardments by the NATO criminals, which is an act of unprecedented discrimination, aimed against all citizens of Yugoslavia.
For the first time since the founding of Eutelsat, one of its members has been denied the right of transmission of its programmes, which poses a most serious threat to others, too. Today it is Serbia and it is only a question of who will be the next. The Eutelsat Board of Directors have explained their decision by saying they wanted to prevent the spreading of religious and national hatred, which they are in fact precisely doing with their own decision.
The Ministry of Information and all media in the Republic of Serbia will continue keeping informed the domestic and world public about all the developments, especially the aggressors' attacks, despite all the force, pressures and blackmail of the international tyrants. 
